The Braden Files
Curiosities of mathematics, history, parachuting, etc……

FUBAR at the DOD

How much did Rumsfeld know?

Secretary Rumsfeld then pulled out a two-page memo and handed it to me. “I wrote this after a promotion interview about two weeks ago,” he explained. “The officer told me that one of the biggest mistakes we made after the war was to allow CENTCOM and CFLCC to leave the Iraq theater immediately after the fighting stopped — and that left you and V Corps with the entire mission.”

“Yes, that’s right,” I said.

“Well, how could we have done that?” he said in an agitated, but adamant, tone. “I knew nothing about it. Now, I’d like you to read this memo and give me any corrections.”

In the memo, Rumsfeld stated that one of the biggest strategic mistakes of the war was ordering the major redeployment of forces and allowing the departure of the CENTCOM and CFLCC staffs in May�June 2003.

“This left General Sanchez in charge of operations in Iraq with a staff that had been focused at the operational and tactical level, but was not trained to operate at the strategic/operational level.” He went on to write that neither he nor anyone higher in the Administration knew these orders had been issued, and that he was dumbfounded when he learned that Gen. McKiernan was out of the country and in Kuwait, and that the forces would be drawn down to a level of about 30,000 by September. “I did not know that Sanchez was in charge,” he wrote.

I stopped reading after I read that last statement, because I knew it was total BS.

Starting to get a little worked up, I paused a moment, and then looked Rumsfeld straight in the eye. “Sir, I cannot believe that you didn’t know I was being left in charge in Iraq.”

“No! No!” he replied. “I was never told that the plan was for V Corps to assume the entire mission. I have to issue orders and approve force deployments into the theater, and they moved all these troops around without any orders or notification from me.”

After the meeting ended, I remember walking out of the Pentagon shaking my head and wondering how in the world Rumsfeld could have expected me to believe him. Everybody knew that CENTCOM had issued orders to drawdown the forces. The Department of Defense had printed public affairs guidance for how the military should answer press queries about the redeployment. There were victory parades being planned. And in mid-May 2003, Rumsfeld himself had sent out some of his famous “snowflake” memorandums to Gen. Franks asking how the general was going to redeploy all the forces in Kuwait. The Secretary knew. Everybody knew.

So what was Rumsfeld doing? Nineteen months earlier, in September 2004, when it was clearly established in the Fay-Jones report that CJTF-7 was never adequately manned, he called me in from Europe and claimed ignorance, “I didn’t know about it,” he said. “How could this happen? Why didn’t you tell somebody about it?”

Now, he had done exactly the same thing, only this time he had prepared a written memorandum documenting his denials. So it was clearly a pattern on the Secretary’s part, and now I recognized it. Bring in the top-level leaders. Profess total ignorance. Ask why he had not been informed. Try to establish that others were screwing things up. Have witnesses in the room to verify his denials. Put it in writing. In essence, Rumsfeld was covering his rear. He was setting up his chain of denials should his actions ever be questioned. And worse yet, in my mind, he was attempting to level all the blame on his generals.

I had never seen any approved CENTCOM campaign plan, either conceptual or detailed, for the post-major combat operations phase. When I was on the ground in Iraq and saw what was going on, I assumed they had done zero Phase IV planning. Now, three years later, I was learning for the first time that my assumption was not completely accurate. In fact, CENTCOM had originally called for twelve to eighteen months of Phase IV activity with active troop deployments. But then CENTCOM had completely walked away by simply stating that the war was over and Phase IV was not their job.

That decision set up the United States for a failed first year in Iraq. There is no question about it. And I was supposed to believe that neither the Secretary of Defense nor anybody above him knew anything about it? Impossible! Rumsfeld knew about it. Everybody on the NSC knew about it, including Condoleezza Rice, George Tenet, and Colin Powell. Vice President Cheney knew about it. And President Bush knew about it.

There’s not a doubt in my mind that they all embraced this decision to some degree. And if it had not been for the moral courage of Gen. John Abizaid to stand up to them all and reverse Franks’s troop drawdown order, there’s no telling how much more damage would have been done.

In the meantime, hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars were unnecessarily spent, and worse yet, too many of our most precious military resource, our American soldiers, were unnecessarily wounded, maimed, and killed as a result. In my mind, this action by the Bush administration amounts to gross incompetence and dereliction of duty.

Ricardo Sanchez
Time.com

Gun in The House

The purpose of fighting is to win. There is no possible victory in defense.
The sword is more important than the shield, and skill is more important than either. The final weapon is the brain. All else is supplemental.

As John Steinbeck once said:

  1. Don’t pick a fight with an old man. If he is too old to fight, he’ll just kill you.
  2. If you find yourself in a fair fight, your tactics suck.
  3. I carry a gun because a cop is too heavy.
  4. When seconds count, the cops are just minutes away.
  5. A reporter did a human-interest piece on the Texas Rangers. The reporter recognized the Colt Model 1911 the Ranger was carrying and asked him ‘Why do you carry a 45?’ The Ranger responded, ‘Because they don’t make a 46.’
  6. An armed man will kill an unarmed man with monotonous regularity.
  7. The old sheriff was attending an awards dinner when a lady commented on his wearing his sidearm. ‘Sheriff, I see you have your pistol. Are you expecting trouble?’ ‘No Ma’am. If I were expecting trouble, I would have brought my rifle.’
  8. Beware the man who only has one gun. HE PROBABLY KNOWS HOW TO USE IT!!!

But wait, there’s more!

I was once asked by a lady visiting if I had a gun in the house. I said I did. She said ‘Well I certainly hope it isn’t loaded!’ To which I said, ‘Of course it is loaded, can’t work without bullets!’
She then asked, ‘Are you that afraid of some one evil coming into your house?’
My reply was, ‘No, not at all. I am not afraid of the house catching fire either, but I have fire extinguishers around, and they are all loaded too.’ To which I’ll add: having a gun in the house that isn’t loaded is like having a car in the garage without gas in the tank.

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